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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 7413

FRED MATTER!,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the late afternoon of Friday, May 6th, 1949, the
body of a dead man, partly submerged in water, later identified
as Levi P. Delk, was discovered by two minors in Little Cottonwood Creek, in the vicinity of Pepper's Hill, Salt Lake County,
Utah. An examination of the body by the coroner disclosed
a laceration about seven inches in length on the back of the
left side of the head, and numerous bruises and abrasions located on the forehead, nose, right eye, right knee, and left
leg (Tr. 88, 126).
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The body of the dead man was dressed in a khaki colored
shirt, a brown suit coat, a pair of shorts, and a pair of shoes
(Tr. 121). The trousers and socks were not on the body (Tr.
124, 125). An examination of the clothing disclosed a bank
book bearing the name of Levi P. Delk, army discharge papers,
and other miscellaneous papers in the inside coat pocket (Tr.
124). In the outside coat pocket, there was a key to the
ignition switch of an automobile later identified as the key to
the Willy's panel truck (Exhibit "H," Tr. 125) owned by the
deceased, and also a small vial containing an unindentified
liquid. This vial was later destroyed when dropped by a deputy
in the sheriff's office.
No definite time was established as to when the deceased
met his death (Tr. 91), and the testimony as to how the deceased died was very conjectural in nature, the doctor who,
examined the body merely having ventured an opinion that
the head-wound described above was inflicted by a blunt instrument of some sort ( T r. 90). . But there was no evidence
of any blunt instrument, or for that matter, of any kind of
an instrument which might have caused the wound.
About ten o'clock A ..M:. on Saturday, April 30th, 1949,
a person, later identified as Fred Matteri, the Defendant, appeared before a notary public in Salt Lake City, Utah, and,
representing himself to be Levi P. Delk, signed a certificate of
title to a Willy's panel truck, identified at the trial as owned
by Delk (Tr. 167). Later, the same morning, the Defendant,
still representing himself to be Levi P. Delk, sold the said
Willy's panel truck to Arch Browning, Inc., a car dealer of
Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 207-212). No ignition key to the
4
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truck was delivered to the car dealer at the time of the sale,
and it was disclosed at the trial that the ignition wires had been
crossed to raake possible the operation of the truck without
the key (Tr. 218, 221).
Between the 1st and 3rd days of May, 1949, the Defendant
attempted to sell a Waltham pocket watch to his fellow workers, which watch was identified as once having belonged to
Delk, and \Yas last seen in Delk's possession in February, 1949
(Tr. 249). Unable to make the sale, the Defendant later
pawned it to the National Loan Company of Salt Lake City,
Utah, for the sum of $7.50. 11atteri used his own name when
he pawned the watch, which had a chain on it at the time of
pawning (Tr. 23 7, 246). The chain never was positively
identified as owned by Delk at any time (Tr. 250, 251).
There was evidence that a gold-plated corn cutter, at one
time used by Delk as a watch fob (Tr. 250, 253), was found in
an open field some distance to the south of the building which
contained the three apartments in the tourist park (Tr. 294).
The corn cutter fob had been taken from among 1800 that
Delk had made up for sale to his patients, and was specially
gold-plated for his personal use.
The evidence showed that Mr. Delk, during the month of
April, 1949, had occupied parking space in a tourist and trailer
park at 3115 South State Street, Salt Lake County, owned and
operated by Mr. and ~Irs. L.A. Christensen. At the same time,
Mr. and Mrs. Matteri and family occupied a tourist apartment
in the same court, J\1rs. Matteri and the children having mr;ved
away about April 20th, leaving Matteri there alone. The
apartment occupied by Matteri was the eastern unit of a build5
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ing containing three units, the center and the west units being
unfinished and unoccupied. The building faced south, and the
southwest corner of it was approximately 65 feet southe1st of
the space occupied by Delk with his truck (Exhibit "Q").
The last Mr. Delk was seen alive was about 5 or 6 p.m. on
Friday, April 29th, when he came into the tourist park in his
truck, and parked it in the rented space. He was not missed
by Mr. and Mrs. Christensen until Sunday, as they understood
he was going fishing (Tr. 140, 180, 203).
A pair of glasses identified as belonging to Mr. Delk was
found in front of the center apartment of the building containing the three units (Tr. 180). The said center apartment
was examined on May 9th by representatives of the Sheriff's
office, at which time two spots on the floor, reddish brown in
color, appearing like blood, were found. One spot was dried,
and the other was still moist, being mixed with what definitely
appeared to be vomit, as determined by the smell. Shavings,
sawdust, papers and other debris were on the floor. The apartment had markings also on the floor, indicating that a struggle
of some kind has taken place therein (Tr. 259-297).
There was a total lack of evidence connecting Matteri,
personally, with Delk, personally, between the time Delk was
last seen alive, and the time his body was discovered in the
creek. No weapon was discovered to connect up the Defendant.
Matteri' s fmg.:;:rprints were not found on the doorknob nor
anywhere else in the center apartment which the State contended was the scene of the alleged homicide (Tr. 338, 345).
No evidence of blood was found on Matteri's clothing. Also,
no evidence was produced of trouble between Matteri and
6
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Delk of any kind, such as quarrels, ill-will, threats, bad feelings,
or revenge.
On 1-fay 8th, Mr. :Niatteri was arrested and charged with
murder in the first degree. In the bill of particulars ( Tr. 12)
furnished the Defendant by the State, Defendant was charged,
first, with having killed Delk with deliberation, premeditation,
and with malice aforethought, and second, with having killed
Delk in the course of committing a robbery, or an attempted
robbery, to which the Defendant pleaded "not guilty."
After the State closed its case at the trial, the Defendant
moved for a dismissal of the first degree murder charge, for
insufficient evidence. This, the court denied (Tr. 382, 384).
The defense then rested, and moved for a directed verdict
of not guilty on the first degree murder charge, and the included
charges of murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter. The motion was denied (Tr. 386).
The jury was instructed by the Court, the defense taking
exception to the Court's refusal to give Defendant's Proposed
Instruction No. XII (Tr. 389). The State and defense made
their arguments to the jury, which thereupon retired to consider
its verdict. After several hours of deliberation, the jury returned for further instructions, the defense objecting to additional comments made by the trial court to the jury at that tin1.e
(Tr. 391-393). After a short deliberation, the jury returned
with a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, with a
recommendation of life imprisonment (Tr. 54).
The defense then moved for a new trial, which motion
was denied (Tr. 397). The Court, disregarding the recom~
7
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mendation of leniency made by the jury, sentenced the Defendant to be executed by shooting (Tr. 403).

STATEMENT OF ERRORS
1. The trial · COIJrt erred in denying Defendant's motion

to dismiss the charge of firs,t 9~egree, murder, for the reason
that the State did not produce sufficient evidence to sustain
. the charge.
2. The trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion

.to instruct the jury to find the ·Defendant not guilty of first
degree murder, for the reason that the State did not introduce
~ufficient evidence of first degree murder to submit to the jury.
3. The trial court erred. in_ denying Defendant's motion
to instruct the jury to find the Defendant not guilty of second
degree murder, for the reason that the State did not introduce
sufficient evidence of second degree murder to submit to the
Jury.
4. The trial court erred in refusing to give the jury Defendant's proposed instruction No. XII (Tr. 31), and in giving
in lieu thereof, the third paragraph of its Instruction No. 7
(Tr. 36) ,. contrary to the provisions of Section 105-32-5, Utah
Code Annotated 1943.
5. The trial court erred in giving the jury Instruction No.
8 (Tr. 36, 3 7), for the reason that said instruction was a
definition of murder, and there was no evidence of murder to
submit to the jury.
8
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6. The trial court erred in giving the jury Instruction No.
9 (Tr. 37, 38), for the reason that said instruction defined first
and second degree murder, and there was no evidence of either
to submit to the jury.
7. The trial court erred in giving the jury Instruction No.
10 (Tr. 38, 39), for the reason that said instruction set forth

the elements of first degree murder as they pertain to this
case, and there was ~nsufficient evidence of the same to submit
to the jury.
8. The trial court erred in giving the jury Instruction No.
11 ( T r. 39) , for the reason that said instruction set forth the

elements of second degree murder as they pertain to this case,
and there was insufficient evidence of the same to submit to
the jury.
9. The trial court erred in commenting to the jury, when
they sought additional instructions, that he had means of investigating the Defendant, or any story the Defendant told
or any statement the Defendant made, and that the court's
investigation would determine whether the court would impose
a life sentence or the death penalty (Tr. 391-393), for the reasen that the jury was misled thereby.
10. The trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion
for a new trial, which refusal is contrary to law.
11. The trial court abused its discretion in ignoring the

jury's recommendation of a life sentence, and in sentencing
the Defendant to be executed.

9
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ARGUMENT NO. I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER AGAINST DEFENDANT.
The information in this case charges that the Defendant,
Fred Matteri, committed the crime of murder in the first degree, by murdering Levi P. Delk. The Bill of Particulars (Tr.
12) furnished the Defendant by the State reads as follows:
"That at the time and place alleged in the Information,
the defendant willfully, deliberately and with the intent to kill
Levi P. Delk, and with malice aforethought and premeditation
killed Levi P. Delk by striking the said Levi P. Delk over the
head with a blunt instrument, the nature and description of
which is unknown to the District Attorney:
"That at the time and place alleged in the Information,
the defendant killed Levi P. Delk while the said Defendant
was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the crime of
robbery in that the said defendant at said time and place was
feloniously taking or attempting to take personal property in
the possession of or in the immediate person of Levi P. Delk,
that the said taking or attempting to take said property was
against the will of the said Levi P. Delk and was accomplished
or attempted to be accomplished by means of force and fear;
that said personal property consisted of a truck, a watch and
other personal property, the exact nature and description of
which is unknown to the District Attorney."
At the conclusion of the State's case, the Defendant moved
that the charge of first degree murder be dismissed, which
motion \vas denied (Tr. 382-384). After the Defendant rested,
10
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the Defendant moved that the jury be directed to find a verdict
of not guilty of murder in the first degree, which motion also
was denied by the Court (Tr. 386). However, even the Court
was convinced that the State had not made out a case of murder
in the course of a robbery or attempted robbery, as set out in
the second paragraph of the bill of particulars quoted above
(Tr. 383), and submitted the case to the jury solely on the
charge of first degree murder as set forth in the first paragraph
of said bill of particulars as above contained.
In the instant case, to make out murder in the first degree,
it is necessary that the State prove, among other elements disputed by the Defendant and dealt with elsewhere in this argument, that the Defendant killed Delk with malice aforethought,
that the killing v:as deliberate and with premeditation, and the
result of a specific intention on the part of Defendant to kill
Delk. If the State failed to prove any one of the foregoing
elements, then no first degree murder charge was made out.
Please see State vs. Russell, a Utah case, 145 Pac. ( 2) 1003.
The Defendant contends, however, that there was absolutely no evidence of premeditation, deliberation, nor of malice
aforethought, nor of a specific intent on the part of the Defendant to kill Delk, nor of other elements of first degree
murder, and that as a result, the State failed to make out its
case.
(A) When we speak of "deliberation," "premeditation,"
and "malice aforethought," and "specific intent," we are speaking of the state of mind, the mental attitude or intent of the
accused formed prior to the commission of a homicide. Not
11
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being able to probe the mind itself, such state of mind must
of necessity be determined by actions of the accused.

In State vs. Russell, supra, this Court very ably discussed
the state of mind as related to first and second degree murder,
and distinguished between the two. This Court, in that case,
held that malice aforethought, being an essential element in
murder at the common law, was adopted by our criminal code
as a necessary element, but that in order to make out murder
in the first degree, the killing itself, not merely the malice, must
be with deliberation and premeditation. The lack of deliberation and premeditation in the killing itself, the other elements of murder being present, would reduce the homicide to
second degree murder.
In the Russell case supra, this Court said:
" . . . The terms p1'emeditation and afo1'ethought both
mean to think out, plan or design beforehand. Some courts
make a slight distinction between those terms and the term
deliberation, holding that it requires more calmness of mind
and cooll)ess of blood for deliberation than merely to premeditate and think out beforehand, but other courts refuse
to make such a distinction."
The Russell case, in speaking of murder in the first degree
requiring a "willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated
killing," says:
"This simply means that the fatal blow must be struck
after deliberately and premeditatedly forming a specific intention or design to kill."
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

These are universal principles, and are subscribed to by
1 Warren on Homicide, Sections 70 and 71; 1 Wharton's
Criminal Law, 12th Ed., Sections 506, 507, 515, 516, 517, and
Section 420 at page 631; together with many other references
contained in the Russell case.
Keeping in mind that in this case, we are concerned with
the state of mind of ~Iatteri before and at the time the alleged
fatal blow was struck (there being no evidence that Matteri
struck the fatal blow), what evidence is there of such a state
of mind? The state of mind is determined by the actions of
the accused prior to, and at the time of the commission of
the act wit., which it is connected. In searching the record,
we find absolutely no acts of Matteri's prior to the alleged
homicide which show any state of mind whatsover in relation
to Delk. There were no acts of preparation, no securing or
selecting of weapons, no lying in wait; there were no boasts,
no threats, no arguments, nor other difficulties between the
accused and Delk.
In substance, the evidence was that Delk was found dead
with a gash on the back of his head several days after the
alleged killing; Matteri was in possession of Delk's truck and
his watch, he having sold the truck by representing himself
as Delk, and having pawned the watch in his own name. But
these are events which occurred after the alleged homicide, and
could not possibly show any state of mind whatsoever that may
have existed many hours earlier. These facts show neither
premeditation, deliberation, malice aforethought, nor specific
intent; for that matter, neither do they show heat of passion,
reckless disregard of life, negligence, nor self-defense. In fact,
13
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it is impossible to conceive of a case wherein there could be less
evidence of a condition of the mind at a given time.
The only actions of an accused after an alleged homicide
which would show a state of mind existing at or before the
killing, would be statements or confessions of such accused.
These are totally lacking in this case.
The absence of evidence of the state of mind of one accused
of murder in the first degree is discussed in People vs. Howard, a
California case, 295 Pac. 333. In that case, there was evidence of
a homicide implicating the Defendant, but except for a purported confession, there was no evidence of the state of mind of the
accused. The Court said:
"To be murder of the first degree, under our statute, the
killing must be premeditated, except when done in the perpetration of certain felonies; that is to say, the unlawful killing
must be accompan:.ed with a deliberate and clear intent to take
life. If the act be preceded by, and be the result of, a concurrence of will, deliberation and intent, the crime of firstdegree murder is proved. People vs. Bellon, 180 Cal. 706,
182 P. 420. When the killing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing further is sho\v'n, the
presumption of law is that it was malicious and an act of murder; but in such a case the verdict should be murder of the
second degree, and not murder of the first degree. People vs.
Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 6, 11 Pac. 793; People vs. Ford, 85 Cal. App.
258, 263, 258 P. 1111.

"In the present case, the prosecution relied principally on
the defendant's confession to prove his connection with the
14
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offense. H the confession be disregarded, the record is enti1'ely
destitute of evidence tending to establish the circumstancgs and
conditions actually existing just pri01· to and at the time of
the striking of the fatal blow. (Italics ours). If, as urged by
the people, the jury in weighing and considering the evtdence
might properly reject as untrue that portion of the confession
wherein defendant charged the decedent with having been the
aggressor in a quarrel which led up to the homicide, there remains no evidence from which it might reasonably be deduced
that the killing was the result of a willful, deliberate, and
premeditated intent to kill. \Ve do not question the propriety
of the jury's action in rejecti:1g any· portion of the defendant's
evidence or confession which to it was unworthy of belief.
However, if it be assumed that this was done in the present
case, there is a dearth of evidence tending to show the conditions as they existed at the time of the homicide, and from
which it might reasonably .be held that the murder was, in fact,
willful, premeditated, and intentional. In this regard, the
state failed to satisfy the burden of proof.''
Applying the rule of the Howard case here, "the record
is ent~Iely destitute of evidence tending to establish the circumstances and conditions actually existing just prior to and
at the time of the striking of the fatal blow."
Thus, under the law as contained in the Russell and Howard cases, the State in the instant case produced no evidence
whatsoever of premeditation, deliberation, malice aforethought
or specific intent to kill Delk, the lack of any one of these
elements being fatal to the State's case. Consequently, there
·was nothing to submit to the jury insofar as first degree mur-

15
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der was concerned, and the trial court should have either dismissed that charge, or directed the jury to bring in verdict of
not guilty to such charge.
(B) There is another criterion which definitely rules out
first degree murder in this case.
Section 103-28-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides
that malice may be express or it may be implied. In 1 Warren
on Homicide, paragraph 67, at page 276, express and implied
malice are discussed as they relate to first degree murder.
Therein, the author states the law to be that express malice
is absolutely essential to murder in the first degree, implied
malice reducing the crime to murder in the second degree.
In paragraph 68, Warren defines express malice in this
manner:
"Express malice is where the killing is the product of a
sedate deliberate mind and formed design. It exists when
there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take
the life of a fellow creature, or to do him some gr:at bodily
harm from which death might result ... A design to kill, or
to inflict serious bodily harm, endangering life, though without lawful excuse or justification, and though fully formed and
fixed in the mind, is not express malice without such design
having an inception and origin in a sedate, delib~rate mind."
Then Warren defines "a sedate, deliberate mind" as a
"mental condition sufficiently composed, calm, and undisturbed to admit of reflection on the design to kill, or to inflict
bodily harm endangering life, and to comprehend the nature
and probably consequences of the act designed."

16
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On the other hand, Warren, in Section 69 at page 285,
defines implied or constructive malice, as "not a fact, but an
inference or conclusion founded upon the particular facts
and circumstances of the case as they are ascertained to exist.
It means that the fact has been attended with such circumstances
as carry with them the plain indication of a malevolent and
diabolical spirit; and it is inferred from any deliberate cruel
act committed by one person against another; from the intentional doing of an unlawful or wrongful act with a wrongful
purpose.''
It is evident from the discussion of deliberation, premeditation and aforethought, as they relate to the evidence in this
case, and as discussed above, that there is no express malice
under Warren's definition, inasmuch as evidence of the accused's state of mind at the time of the alleged homicide just
does not exist. There just is no evidence that Matteri killed
Delk with a sedate deliberate mind, or that he even struck the
fatal blow. Thus, malice, if it existed at all in this case, could
not possibly be more than implied.
Consequently, in applying Warren's rule, supported by
the cases therein cited, there is a total absence of express malice
in the instant case. Thus, for this reason also, the State
failed to make out a case of murder in the first degree, and, as
a result, there was insufficient evidence for the case to have
been submitted to the jury.
(C) In addition, not only has the State failed to make
out deliberation, premeditation, malice aforethought, specific
intent to kill Delk, and express malice, it also has failed to produce evidence that the killing was at the hands of Matteri.
17
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Evidence connecting Matteri, personally, with Delk, personally, at the time of the alleged offense, or at any other time,
for that matter, just does not exist. There was no evidence
that Matteri took the truck from the physical possession or
presence of Delk. The fact that the wires were crossed on the
ignition to enable its operation (Tr. 218, 221), and the further
fact that Delk, when his body was discovered in the creek,
had the ignition switch key in his pocket, (Tr. 125 and Exhibit "H") would indicate that no physical contact was had
between Matteri and Delk in regard to the truck.
At the time Delk' s body was found in the creek, there was
. no evidence that his pockets or their contents had been disturbed
in the least. He had on no trousers (Tr. 124, 125), so there
is no evidence that the wa~ch, a pocket model, had been removed from his person. In fact, the last time the watch was
established to have been in his possession was in February
( T r. 249) , almost three months earlier.
There was an absolute lack of evidence that Delk and
l\!Iatteri had been seen together during the interval in question, or at any other time. Consequently, nothing in the record
connects these parties, physically, during the period of time
the alleged homicide took place. In fact, the crossed wires
on the truck, and the ignition key being on the dead body,
would tend to negative any personal connection between the
two parties.
The dark spots on the floor of the apartment next to that
occupied by 1vfatteri were not proved to contain human blood,
as the tests were inconclusive. True, blood on a paint stick
18
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and on a small piece of brown paper, found in the apartment,
had blood type A on them, which was the same type as that
of Delk (Tr. 319, 329). But this classification extended only
to these two samples. However, Mr. Duncan, the F. B. I.
laboratory technician, testified that 42 per cent of the people
of the country were of the same blood type (Tr. 328). It
is only by bare supposition that the blood on the paint stick
and brown paper was Delk's.
Thus, it was not established that the alleged homicide took
place in the center apartment as theorized by the State. And
even though one concludes that it did, there is still a total
lack of evidence connecting Matteri with the apartment.
Matteri' s fingerprints were not on the doorknob, nor elsewhere
in the apartment (Tr. 338, 345). Not only was there no
weapon produced by the State, but also lacking were fingerprints of the accused on any weapon. The key to the apartment was of the commonest variety (Tr. 142, 146-148), so
that the apartment was read.i.ly accessible to many persons besides
the accused. Consequently, the State failed, completely, to
tie Matteri in with the killing.
If, as the State contended, the homicide was committed
by the accused in the apartment next to his, someone must
· have moved the body to the creek, and it is only reasonable to
assume that it was done by the assailant. But in doing so,
the assailant would have had tell-tale blood on his clothing.
However, there was no such evidence on that of Matteri's.
Thus, to summarize Argument No. 1, only the following
conclusions can be reached:
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The elements of premeditation, deliberation, malice aforethought, and specific intent to kill Delk, absolutely necessary
to first degree murder, are totally lacking.
Malice, if it existed at all, was only implied, the universal
legal requirement being express, in order to constitute first
degree murder.
There was a complete lack of evidence connecting the
person of Matteri with the person of Delk at the time of the
alleged homicide, or at any other time.
The State, having failed to establish the foregoing elements, or any one of them, did not make out a case of first
degree murder, and for that reason, the trial court should have
dismissed the charge of first degree murder, or should have
instructed the jury to bring in a verdict of not guilty of the
same. Having done neither, the trial court should have granted
Defendant's motion for a new trial.

ARGUMENT NO. 2
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF SECOND DEGREE
MURDER AGAINST DEFENDANT.
In the Russell case, supra, which clearly states the law of
murder in the first and second degrees, this Court discusses
statutory and common law murder, stating in effect that the
provisions of Section 103-28-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
adopted the common law definition of murder. This Court
then went on to say that those common law murders in which
the killing itself is the result of deliberation and premeditation,
20

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or which are committed in the perpetration of one of the four
named felonies, are murder in the first degree. All other homicides which are murder under the common law, are murders
in the second degree.
The Court then said:
"In order to have the necessary malice. to commit murder
(not necessarily murder in the first degree), the killing must
be unlawful, it must result from or be caused by an act or omission to act committed with one of the following intentions:
( 1) An intention or design previously formed to kill or cause
great bodily injury; or (2) an intention or design previously
formed to do an act or omit to do an act, knowing the reasonable and natural consequences thereof would be likely to
cause death or great bodily injury; or ( 3) a previously thought
out intentional or designed perpetration or attempt to perpetrate one of ·certain kinds of felonies. This is not limited to
arson, rape, burglary and robbery mentioned in Sec. 103-28-3,
U. C. A. 1943, but it does not include all felonies. 1 Warren
on Homicide, Sees. 62, 71 to 76, 78 and 79; 1 Wharton's Criminal Law, 12th Ed., Sections 420, 421, 447, 504, 507, 509 to
512, and 515 to 518; 2 Brill's Cyc. of Criminal Law, Sections
619 to 636; People vs. Davis, supra (8 Ut. 412, 32 P. 670);
People vs. Halliday, supra (5 Ut. 467, 17 P. 118)."
Insofar as the instant case is concerned, that part of No.
( 1) above referring to a design or intention to kill, which
would show first degree murder, has been disposed of in Argument No. 1. Thus, we have remaining that part of ( 1) referring to an "intention or design previously formed" to "cause
great bodily injury," and in (2) above, the question whether
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there was "an intention or design previously formed to do an
act or omit to do an act, knowing the reasonable and natural
consequences thereof would be likely to cause death or great
bodily injury." The trial court, in referring to second degree
murder, submitted the case to the jury on these two propositions (Tr. 39, Instruction No. 11, paragraph 3). From these
quotations from the Russell case, should either ( 1) or ( 2) be
proved, along with the other elements of second degree murder,
then the State has made out its case.
The foregoing references to the Russell case are really
dealing with malice aforethought. On this point, the Russell
case further states:
"The statute requires not only that the killing be done
with malice, but that the malice must have been 'aforethought.'
This simply means the malice was thought out before hand,
or previously planned or designed or premeditated. 1 Warren
on Homicide, Sec. 79 'Deliberation and Premeditation'; 1
Wharton's Criminal Law, 12th Ed., Sections 421 and 507; 2
Brill's Cyc. of Criminal Law, Sec. 617."
As set forth in Argument No. 1 herein, when we speak
of intention, premeditation, deliberation, and afot'ethought,
we are speaking of a state of mind. In this connection, the
state of mind with which we are concerned is that existing
before and at the commission of an act. However, according
to the Howard case, supra, it is the actions of the accused at
such times which evidence his state of mind.
Now let us consider the facts of this case. As pointed out
in Argument No. 1, there are no actions whatsoever of Matteri's
which evidence any state of mind at the time of the alleged
22
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homicide. In fact, we do not even know with any definiteness
when the alleged killing actually did take place. The only
evidence we have is that lviatteri had possession of the truck
and watch, and that he sold the former representing himself
as Delk, and pawned the latter in his own name. But these are
not actions that are prior to, or concurrent with the alleged
homicide. Thus, they do not show any state of mind whatsoever that may have occurred at the time of the alleged homicide,
as pointed out in the Howard case.
But this is not all. Most important is the complete lack
of evidence that Matteri's possession bf the truck and watch
was connected in time and place with the alleged assault. As
pointed out in Argument No. 1 herein, there is not only a total
lack of evidence connecting the victim and the accused, but the
crossed wires on the truck show a disconnection between the
two persons. The lack of trousers on Delk show a disconnection also in regard to the pccket model watch. Thus, there
is a total absence of evidence that 11atteri was the one who
committed the assault.
To recapitulate: The State has failed to produce any
evidence showing an intention or design previously formed
to cause great bodily injury; it failed to produce evidence of
an intention or design previously formed to do an act, knowing
the reasonable and natural consequences thereof would be
likely to cause death or great bodily injury; and it has failed
to produce evidence that any assault whatsoever was committed by the accused.
Consequently, the only conclusion that can be reached
is that the State has completely failed to make out either malice
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or aforethought, required by ( 1) and (2) quoted above from
the Russell case, and has failed to connect Matteri with an
alleged assault, which allegedly resulted in Delk's death.
Insofar as ( 3) is concerned in the quotation from the
Russell case, even the trial court did not think there was sufficient evidence of robbery, or of any other felony, for that
matter, to go to the jury (Tr. 383). Thus, no felony has been
established to bring the case within the requirements of murder
in the second degree.
Therefore, the State did not make out a case of second
degree murder against Matteri, and the trial court should have
instructed the jury to bring in a verdict of not, guilty >f this
charge, as moved by the Defendant. The trial court, having
failed to grant this motion, should have granted Defendant's
motion for a new trial.

ARGUMENT NO. 3
THE TRIAL COURT MISDIRECTED THE JURY IN
MATTERS OF LAW.
We next turn our attention to erroneous instructions given
to the jury by the trial court.
(A) The Defendant requested the trial court to instruct
the jury as follows (Defendant's requested Instruction No.
XII, Tr. 31):

"If you find from the evidence that the Defendant has
committed a public offense and there is reasonable ground of
doubt in which of two or more degrees he is guilty, under the
24
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law of this state you must find him guilty of the lowest of
such degrees only." (Italics ours.)
In requesting this instruction, the Defendant followed
substantially the wording of Section 105-32-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943.
However, the trial court refused to use the word must,
which is the language of the statute, but use the word ccm
(Instruction No. 7, Tr. 36), to which the Defendant excepted
(Tr. 389).
The defense contends that these two words are not interchangeable, as they do not convey the same or similar meaning.
According to Webster "can" means to have ability, skill, knowledge, capacity ,or means. But "must" means compulsion, requirement or necessity.
Thus, the trial court in using can, instructed the jury that
it had ability, skill, knowledge, capacity or means to find the
Defendant guilty of the lowest of such degrees. But the
statute referred to provides, in using the word must, that the
jury is compelled to, required to, or of necessity should find
the Defendant guilty of the lowest of such degrees. In other
words, by the L.'lstruction as given, the jury could not understand that it was compelled or required to bring in a verdict
of the lowest degree, should there be reasonable doubt m
which of two or more degrees Defendant was guilty.
Consequently, the trial court not ?nly committed error .in
using can in place of must, but the jury was misled thereby.
(B) It is the position of the Defendant that, inasmuch as
the State did not produce evidence of either first or se<.ond
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degree murder, the trial court should not have submitted such
charges to the jury in the instructions given. Rather than reargue these points, suffice it to say that in Arugments Nos. 1
and 2 herein, we have pointed out the following:
The State did not produce any evidence that Matteri assaulted Delk which resulted in Delk's death.
The State did not produce any evidence of malice aforethought.
The State did not produce any evidence of willfulness,
deliberation, premeditation, or specific intent on the part of
11atteri to kill Delk.
The State did not produce any evidence of Matteri's intent
to do great bodily harm to Delk.
Thus, the charges of first and second degree murder failing, and Matteri not being connected with the killing or with
any assault on Delk, the following instructions should not have
been given by the trial court to the jury:
Instructions No.8 (Tr. 36, 37), which sets out the statutory
definition of murder, wherein malice aforethought is required,
and is defined.
Instruction No. 9 (Tr. 37, 38), which distinguishes between first and second degree murder.
Instruction No. 10 (Tr. 38, 39), which sets out the essential elements of first degree murder, including willfulness, deliberation, premeditation, specific intent to kill Delk, and
malice aforethought.
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Instruction No. 11 (Tr. 39), which sets out the essential
elements of second degree murder, including malice aforethought and specific intent to do great bodily harm to Delk.
Consequently, the trial court should have dismissed the
two charges of first and second degree murder as moved by
the Defendant (Tr. 385, 386), and should not have given the
instructions enumerated.
(C) After the jury had been deliberating several hours,
the trial court c~lled in the jury to make inquiry concerning
their progress (Tr. 390}. Mr. Christensen, the foreman, told
the court that Instruction No. 15 was not clear (Tr. 391). After
considerable explanation by the trial court on the matter of
recommendations, Mr. Christensen, the jury foreman, proceeded further v;ith this question: "We ask the recommendations, just what is it-what we would like to know is how
you look at it." (Tr. 392).
In response, the trial court said (Tr. 392): "Oh, well,
what that means-now, I tell the jury now that I will make
investigations before I act one way or the other. If you make
recommendations, all you do is to untie my hands so that 1 may
not Ofder the defendant executed. If you do not sign that,
then you do not permit me to make any investigation or to determine. I can't tell you now what I am going to do because
I don't know. I would need more information than I now have
before I v.rould act in a matter of this weighty importance. I
have ways and means of securing information that this jury
would not have, but you do not tie my hands nor compel me to
follow your recommendations. You merely give me the right
27
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to do it if after making an investigation I feel that it should
be done, then I can, but I am not obligated to."
However, the question Mr. Christensen asked was for
the purpose of obtaining from the trial court his opinion as
what he would do in the event a recommendation was made
by the jury. But the trial court, in answering, took this occasion to make an elaborate statement as to how he would reach
a decision in the event the jury brought in a verdict of murder
in the first degree and recommended a life sentence, which
statement was uncalled for and gave the jury information to
which it was not entitled.
In addition, the explanation quoted above misled the jury,
particularly that part of it in which the trial court stated that
he would need more "information than I now have before I
would act in a matter of this weighty importance." When the
trial court made this statement, he had as much evidence as
the jury had on which to base a judgment; but by telling the
members of the jury that he needed further information, he
led them to believe that they did not have all the facts. Therefore, they were willing to take the trial court at his word that
he had ways and means of obtaining information that the
jury would not have. Thus, the jury brought in a verdict of
first degree murder with a recommendation, instead of a lesser
degree of homicide, which they might well have done, had
the trial court not told them that he had ways and means
of obtaining information which the jury did not have, and
that he needed more information than had come out in the
trial.
As the result of the erroneous instructions given the jury
28
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1

by the trial court, as fully set out above, prejudicial error occurred. For this reason, the trial court should have granted
Defendant's motion for a new trial.

ARGUMENT NO. 4
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE OR THE LAW.
The Defendant contends that the jury's verdict of guilty
of murder in the first degree, against Fred Matteri, is totally
unsupported by the evidence produced by the State, and was
contrary to the law of the case as contained in the trial court's
instructions.
Particular attention is called to the trial court's instruction
No. 10 (Tr. 38) wherein nine elements of the crime charged
against this Defendant must be proved in order to warrant a
conviction of murder in the first degree.
(A) In the first item, the jury was instructed that they
must find "that on or about the 30th day of April, 1949, ...
the defendant, Fred !vfatteri, killed Levi P. Delk." However,
as shown in Arguments Nos. 1 and 2 herein, there was absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support such a contention.
Nothing linked Matteri personally, with Delk personally, at
the time of the alleged homicide, or at any other time. Thus,
the jury found that Matteri killed Delk in spite of this complete
lack of evidence.
(B) The fifth requirement of Instruction No. 10 is that
the killing was deliberate. In the fourth paragraph of In29
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struction No. 14, "deliberate" is defined as a "cool state of
blood and not a sudden passion. It connotes the commission
of a crime under circumstances in which the perpetrator weighs
the motives for his act, its consequences and its nature, and
all other circumstances upon which his decision to commit
such act is based."
As argued in Argument No. 1 herein, there was a total
absence of evidence of Matteri' s state of mind at the time of
the alleged homicide, for nowhere in the record is there evidence of any actions which could be interpreted as "deliberation" or otherwise. There was no evidence that he was in a
cool state of blood, or that he weighed the motives for any act,
or its consequences and nature. Thus, there was no evidence
which would support a conclusion that Matteri had "deliberately" committed any act involving Delk. The jury completely
disregarded the court's instruction in so finding.
(C) The sixth requirement as set out in Instruction No. 10
1s that the killing was with malice aforethought. ''Malice
aforethought" is defined in Instruction No. 8 (Tr. 36) as preexisting malice. "Malice" means that condition of mind which
prompts a person to do a wrongful act intentionally, without
justification or excuse.
However, in considering the evidence produced by the
State, there was none showing Matteri did a wrongful act
intentionally, insofar as homicide is concerned. As 1.rgued
heretofore, there was no evidence whatsoever connecting him
and Delk personally. In regard to "aforethought," again we
are concerned with the state of mind of ~.:fatteri at the time of
30
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the alleged offense. But again, as argued in Arguments Nos.
1 and 2, there was no evidence of a state of mind at such a time.
Consequently, the jury had absolutely no evidence to find
that Matteri did any act connected with the alleged killing with
"malice aforethought," or "preexisting malice." Thus, the
finding of the jury was totally unsupported by the evidence, and
was contrary to the law of the case as contained in the trial
court's instructions.
(D) The seventh requirement of first degree murder as
contained in Instruction No. 10, is that said killing was premeditated. "Premeditate" is defined in Instruction 14 as the
"act of meditating, contriving, or designing beforehand and
for any length of time. The time must be sufficient, however,
for some reflection on and consideration of the act in contemplation during which the alternative choices of killing and
not killing are debated in the mind of the actor and for the
formation of a definite purpose to kill."
Again, all that can be said is that such evidence is totally
lacking, as set forth in Argument No. 1. There is a complete
absence of any evidence which would show that Matteri meditated, contrived or designed beforehand, or for that matter,
at any time, the death of Delk. :Nor is there any evidence which
the jury could possibly find that Matteri reflected upon the
act of killing, or that he debated in his mind, or that he formed
a definite purpose to kill.
Thus, the jury, in finding that Matteri premeditated the
act of killing Delk, did so in the face of absolutely no evidence
in support of the same, which was contrary to the law of the
case.
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(E) The eighth element as contained in Instruction No.
10 is that the killing was the result of a specific intention on the
part of Fred Matteri to take the life of Delk. "Specific intent"
is defined in Instruction No. 14 as "a fixed direction of the
mind to a particular object or a determination to act in a particular manner."
Again, we are compelled to repeat that there was a total
lack of Matteri's mental state. Nowhere in the record is there
evidence that Matteri ever had a "fixed direction of the mind"
toward Delk, or a "determination to act" in any manner toward
Delk, either to take his life or in regard to any other thing
concerning him.
Inasmuch as the State failed in this particular, the jury was
totally unwarranted in finding such specific intent. Again, the
finding was contrary to the evidence and the law of the case.
To summarize Argument No. 4, we find that the jury disregarded the evidence and the law of the case in the following
particulars: (A) In finding that Matteri killed Delk; (B) In
finding that the killing was deliberate; (C) In finding that the
killing was with malice aforethought; (D) in finding that the
killing was premeditated; (E) In finding that the killing was
the result of a specific intention on the part of Fred Matteri
to take the life of Delk.
Thus, in five particulars, the jury disregarded the evidence
and the law of the case. Had the jury done so in only one of
the foregoing items, it would be sufficient to warrant a new trial.
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ARGUMENT NO. 5
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISRE~
GARDING THE JURY'S RECOM~fENDATION OF LIFE
IMPRISONlvfENT.
)

Section 103-28-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, in providing the penalty for murder, reads as follows:
"Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall
suffer death, or, upon the recommendation of the jury, may
be imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison for life, in the
discretion of the court."
This Court, in State vs. Markham '(1941), 112 P. (2)
496, held that where a Defendant is convicted of murder in
the first degree with a recommendation for life imprisonment,
it is not mandatory on the trial court to follow such recommendation, but the arbitrary exercise of this discretionary
power of the trial court is reviewable.
Defendant contends that the trial ·court abused its discretionary powers in this case, when it disregarded the recolnmendation of the jury.
If ever there was a case with little or no evidence to support
the charge against an accused, this is it. As shown in the
foregoing arguments, evidence was completely lacking in support of essential elements of first degree murder. To call it
a case of circumstantial evidence supporting first degree murder,
is to give it a dignity to which it is not entitled.
Undoubtedly, it was because of the skimpy case presented
by the State that the jury recommended. life imprisonment.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In addition, as explained in Argument No. 3 (C) herein, the
jury was concerned with how the trial court would look at
the recommendation of life imprisonment. Having been
assured by the trial court that he had access to information not
available to the jury, it reached a verdict at once of first degree
murder, with a recommendation of life imprisonment. It might
well have been that the jury would have brought in a second
degree murder conviction in place of first degree, had it not
been for the reassurance given by the trial court that he had
other means of ascertaining the facts relating to the Defendant.
However, the trial court, in preparing the Defendant for
the sentence which he intended to impose, made it very clear
at the time the jury announced its verdict and recommendation,
that he expected the Defendant to make a statement the court
would believe, if he hoped at all to receive any mercy from
him (Tr. 395, 396). But the trial court was not entirely clear
as to just what he expected the Defendant to tell him, until
Mr. Fratto, one of Defendant's counsel, was pleading for his
life at the time of sentence ( T r. 400) . In response to Mr.
Fratto's plea, the trial court said:
"Except that he (the Defendant) must stand the full
inferences. That is the only thing I can say, that while I hold
that not against him, if he should avoid the inferences that the
evidence shows, the burden is on him to tell how he got that
possession (of the truck and watch), if he is not guilly as
charged and as found." (Italics ours.)
In other words, the trial court said that if the Defendant,
after having been convicted by a jury of twelve men, could say
something to the court which he would believe, to convince
34
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him that he, the Defendant, "is not guilty as charged and as
found," he would then become the subject of leniency in the
eyes of the trial court.
In view of the basis upon which the jury undoubtedly
predicated its recommendation, and the further attitude of the
trial court in asking that the Defendant convince him that he
(the Defendant) was not guilty as charged and as found, the
Defendant submits without further argun1ent, that this was
abuse of discretion-gross abuse, and that the sentence of
execution pronounced by the trial court is reviewable, and
should be reversed by this Honorable Court.
SUMMARY
By way of recapitulation, the Defendant summarizes the
foregoing arguments as follows:
1. The State produced absolutely no evidence of first
degree murder against this Defendant.

A. The record contains no evidence of premeditation,
deliberation, malice aforethought, or specific intent
to kill Delk.
B. Express malice, essential to prove first degree murder, is totally lacking.
C. The State completely failed to produce evidence
that the Defendant committed the alleged assault
that resulted in death.
2. The State produced no evidence of second degree mur-

der against the Defendant.
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A. There is no evidence of an intention or design by
Matteri to cause great bodily injury to Delk.
B. There is no evidence of malice aforethought.
C. There is no evidence that Matteri killed Delk.
3. The trial court misdirected the jury in matters of law
to the prejudice of the Defendant.
A. In instructing the jury that should there be reasonable doubt as to whch of two or more degrees the
Defendant is guilty, the jury can find Defendant
guilty only of the lowest degree, the trial court
erred; it should have used must as provided in
Section 105-32-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and
as proposed by the Defendant.
B. Inasmuch as the State failed to produce evidence
of either first or second degree murder, the trial
court should not have submitted those charges to
the jury, and should not have given the jury instructions thereon.

C. The comments of the trial court to the jury that
he had ways and means of securing information that
the jury did not have, gave the jury information to
which it was not entitled, and it was misled thereby.
4. The jury's verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree
is not supported by the law nor the evidence.
A. There is no evidence that Matteri killed Delle
B. There is no evidence of deliberation.
36
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C. There is no evidence of malice aforethought.
D. There is no evidence of premeditation.
E. There is no evidence that Matteri had specific intent
to kill Delk.
5. The trial court abused its discretion when it disregarded the recommendation of the jury that Defendant be
imprisoned for life, and sentenced him to be executed.

CONCLUSIONS
In view of the foregoing arguments, we cannot avoid
reaching the following conclusions: ( 1) The State totally failed
to prove a case of first degree murder against the Defendant;
(2) The State did not even prove a case of second degree
murder against the Defendant; and ( 3) The trial court grossly
abused its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to be
executed, in the face of a recommendation of life imprisonment, made by the jury at the time it brought in its verdict.
Consequently, the trial court should have granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of first degree murder
against Fred Matteri. Having not done so, then it was the
duty of the trial court to direct the jury to bring in a verdict
of not guilty to the first and second degree murder charges,· as
moved by counsel for the Defendant. Having done neither,
and having misdirected the jury in matters of law, as herein
set forth, and the jury having brought in a verdict of first
degree murder completely unsupported by the law and the evi37
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dence of the case, it was incumbent upon the trial court to
grant Defendant's motion for a new trial.
Thus, counsel for the Defendant urges this Honorable
Court to remand this case to the trial court with instructions
to dismiss the charges of first and second degree murder.
Should it be that the conviction of Fred Matteri be sustained, then counsel for Defendant urges this Honorable Court
to remand this case to the trial court with instructions to follow
the recommendation of the jury, and re-sentence the Defendant
to life imprisonment.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH C. FRATTO,
GORDON B. CHRISTENSON,
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER,

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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